Watch out, people, I have been ranting up a storm over at the ol’ moedidde blog. But I’ve been trying to stop blogging about the elections, because I find myself just saying the same things over and over again. Instead, I’ve been plotting a post that Vernon suggested to me–an overview of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In fact, he suggested I do a video blog, which I thought was a fantastic idea! But, my camera that records video was recently loaned to a friend..and I’ve been waiting and waiting to get it back for said video blog. The fact that you’re reading my writing instead of hearing and seeing me now is a clear sign that said friend still has said camera. So there’s an exciting tidbit of my life that has led to my recent stall in blog posts here at His Voice, and is now leading to my just-going-ahead-and-writing-the-post. Feel free to suggest another topic that I can video post on in the future.
So. The CPA. Whew. Take a deep breath, everyone! Here goes….
The CPA, also known as the “Naivasha Agreement” was signed between North & South Sudan in 2005, after a 22-year long civil war that killed 2 million people and displaced 4 million. The CPA outlined for six years of Southern semi-autonomy, after which a referendum would come to vote, giving Southern Sudan the opportunity to secede from Sudan, becoming a fully-autonomous nation (which, as of now, is on course for 2011).
The main points within the CPA include:
- The Machakos Protocol – implements the 6-year period during which Southern Sudan rules itself as a semi-autonomous region, forming their own government and yet continuing to “report” to Northern Sudan. It is after this 6-year period (ending in 2011) that Southern Sudan will have the right to vote in a referendum for unity with Sudan or full secession. Halfway through this period, there shall be national elections (the ones that just took place in April 2010 were originally meant to have occurred in 2008, which would have allowed for a more reasonable amount of time to prepare for the Southern secession referendum).
- Power Sharing – Both North and South Sudan members will be represented in the national government (70/30 with NCP holding majority), including members of the newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Meanwhile, more power shall be given to individual states.
- Wealth Sharing – 2% of the oil revenue will go to oil producing states of Southern Sudan with the remaining revenue divided among the two governments. This section also has protocol for banking and currency in Sudan.
- Resolution of the Abyei Conflict – Abyei, one of the most protested areas of Sudan due to its mass of oil wealth and central location, will be granted special administrative status. At the end of the 6-year period, Abyei will vote to either maintain this status within Northern Sudan, or become an official part of Southern Sudan. Oil revenues for Abyei should be split (50/42) with NCP holding the majority and the remaining percentage going to local states).
- Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile – This is a similar situation to the Abyei issue–these regions are centrally located, technically part of Northern Sudan, but ethnically more similar with the South, so it creates a bit of a debacle as to which region they should be a part of. This resolution contains similar protocol for oil shares and borders in these two regions as in Abyei. (FYI Nuba Mountains is in Southern Kordofan.)
- Security Arrangements – Equal numbers of soldiers from both Southern & Northern armies will be combined to form the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) to provide safety and security in the region (read: to hassle people unnecessarily whenever they want. But that’s just my take on it.) Really, though, as peacekeepers. While there’s been a lot of small-scale violence, I suppose in general the peace has been kept.
- Permanent Ceasefire – ‘Nuff said.
These are the main points of the CPA. So what’s the big deal? Seems straightforward enough.
But nothing that involves international politics and conflict is ever very straightforward. The main discrepancies with the CPA have involved the oil revenues which have not been provided to the South as the CPA outlines for them to be, and the Darfur conflict which obviously is the opposite of a ceasefire and has implications throughout the country. While the CPA makes it glaringly clear who should get what oil revenues, the NCP has hesitated to fulfill those contracts because it means less money for them. And while the conflict in Darfur is not a North/South conflict, so technically falls outside of the
constraints of the CPA, it is still preventing the country from overall stability.
So when you hear things in the news about Sudan’s government violating the CPA or the events in the country threatening to not fulfill it, hopefully this gives you an idea of what they’re talking about. At this point in time, the main issue up for discussion is keeping everything in tact and peaceful for the 2011 referendum.
If you want to go more in depth, here is the CPA itself. And here is a paper I wrote called “Challenges to Peacemaking” that gives more detail specific to the Nuba Mountains region (note: this paper was a collaboration, the portion I wrote on Sudan is the second section).